DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorSchool of Accounting and Financeen_US
dc.creatorWang, Zen_US
dc.creatorSun, Len_US
dc.creatorWei, KCJen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-18T08:20:27Z-
dc.date.available2021-05-18T08:20:27Z-
dc.identifier.issn0378-4266en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/90041-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.subjectAnalyst efforten_US
dc.subjectAnalyst forecast activitiesen_US
dc.subjectCompetitionen_US
dc.subjectHerdingen_US
dc.subjectStrategy deviationen_US
dc.titleDoes competition induce analyst effort? evidence from a natural experiment of broker mergersen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.volume119en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105914en_US
dcterms.abstractHong and Kacperczyk (2010) document that decreases in analyst competition due to broker mergers encourage analysts to please managers, leading to greater consensus optimism bias. We propose three additional effects of analyst competition. The analyst effort hypothesis suggests that weaker competition reduces analysts’ incentives to collect and analyze information. The herding hypothesis argues that weaker competition reduces analysts’ career concerns, which in turn reduces herding incentives. The strategic deviation hypothesis implies that weaker competition alleviates analysts’ incentives to strategically deviate from others. We find that after broker mergers, analysts follow fewer firms and switch their coverage from firms with more to those with less R&D expenses. They weigh their private information less when it is unfavorable. At the same time, their forecasts become more dispersed. All these findings appear to be more consistent with the analyst effort hypothesis than the herding or strategic deviation hypothesis.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsembargoed accessen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationJournal of banking and finance, Oct. 2020, v. 119, 105914en_US
dcterms.isPartOfJournal of banking and financeen_US
dcterms.issued2020-10-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85089747660-
dc.identifier.eissn1872-6372en_US
dc.identifier.artn105914en_US
dc.description.validate202105 bchyen_US
dc.description.oaNot applicableen_US
dc.identifier.FolderNumbera0801-n08-
dc.description.fundingSourceRGCen_US
dc.description.fundingTextRGC: RI/93/94.BM02en_US
dc.description.pubStatusPublisheden_US
dc.date.embargo2023.10.31en_US
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